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ABSTRACT
The major theme of this article is that the interpretation of contracts -- their possible amplification,
correction, and modification by adjudicators -- is in the interests of contracting parties. The general
reasons are (a) that interpretation may improve on otherwise imperfect contracts; and (b) that the
prospect of interpretation allows parties to write simpler contracts and thus to conserve on
contracting effort. A method of interpretation is defined as a function whose argument is the written
contract and whose value is another contract, the interpreted contract, which is what actually governs
the parties' joint enterprise. It is shown that interpretation is superior to enforcement of contracts as


















  The major theme of this article is that the interpretation of contracts -- their 
possible amplification, correction, and modification by adjudicators -- is in the interests 
of contracting parties.  The reasons are no doubt well-appreciated in at least a general 
sense: interpretation may improve on otherwise imperfect contracts; and the prospect of 
interpretation allows parties to write simpler contracts and thus to conserve on 
contracting effort. 
  As background, we know from common experience that parties may fail to 
provide for certain events in their contracts (suppose that they overlook the possibility of 
a leap year) and that they often employ broad terms that do not reflect their wishes in 
particular circumstances (suppose that they specify that material A should be used in 
construction but that they would really prefer substitution of material B if an unusual 
problem arises with A).  To explain why parties write such incomplete contracts, it is 
frequently suggested that some eventualities are hard to anticipate or describe in advance, 
that leaving contracts incomplete saves time and effort, and that fashioning highly refined 
contracts would be impractically costly.
1 
                                                 
1 This explanation for incomplete contracts was early emphasized by Williamson (1985).  For 
discussion of it and of other reasons for incompleteness, see, for example, Hart and Holmström (1987), 
Hart and Moore (1999), and Tirole (1999).   
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We also observe that the courts actively engage in the interpretation of contracts.  
The courts fill gaps in contracts, resolve conflicts and ambiguities of language, and 
sometimes replace the parties’ express terms with the courts’ terms (such as to permit 
substitution of material B if a problem with A occurs).
2  Moreover, the interpretation of 
contracts is widely understood to influence how parties write contracts; parties are more 
willing to leave gaps and to write fairly general terms the more closely the courts’ 
interpreted contracts resemble the parties’ true wishes, whereas parties are more willing 
to take extra pains to write more detailed contracts when courts refrain from interpreting 
terms or interpret terms in ways that run counter to their true desires. 
Given this motivation, the writing of contracts and the courts’ interpretation of 
them is examined here in a basic model of contracting, and the optimal method of 
interpretation is investigated.   
In section 2, the main assumptions of the model are stated.  These include that 
parties are risk-neutral, that they have symmetric information, that all variables are 
contractible, but that writing contracts involves costs that rise with the number of 
contractual terms.
3  A method of interpretation is defined as a function whose argument is 
the written contract and whose value is another contract, the interpreted contract.  It is the 
interpreted contract, not the written contract, that actually governs the parties’ joint 
enterprise.   
In section 3, the type of contract that parties choose to write is examined.  In 
particular, it is asked when parties decide to stipulate specific terms, when they elect to 
                                                 
2 See generally chapter 7 of Farnsworth (1999) and section 6 below. 
   
3 The assumptions are perhaps those that allow the most transparent development of the points of 
interest.  However, as will be discussed in section 6 and is noted later in the introduction, many of the 
qualititive conclusions hold independently of the contractual environment.  
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write broad terms, and when they wish to leave gaps, given the courts’ method of 
interpretation of contracts and given the cost of writing additional terms.  Thus, note that 
how parties write contracts is influenced not only by writing costs, but also by the method 
of interpretation. 
In section 4 the courts’ optimal method of interpretation of contracts is 
considered.   For any method of interpretation, one can determine the contracts that 
parties will decide to write (as described in section 3), their costs of so doing, the 
interpreted contract that actually will be employed, and consequently the expected payoff 
from the written contract.  Of course, the contracts that are written will vary among 
contracting parties, depending on their underlying situation -- the payoffs that they enjoy 
given their acts and the contingencies that obtain.  The underlying situation of a pair of 
contracting parties (the payoff function) is called their contractual type.  It is assumed 
that the contractual type of contracting parties is not observable to the courts, so that the 
courts must use the same method of interpretation for all contracting parties.  The optimal 
method of interpretation maximizes the expected value of contracts net of writing costs 
over the population of contractual types.   
The conclusions about the optimal method of interpretation can be summarized as 
follows.  First, some method of interpretation of contracts is always socially desirable: 
the optimal method of interpretation is strictly superior to literal enforcement of contracts 
as written.  This is true because there exists, at the least, a way of filling gaps that allows 
some parties to reduce the number of terms in their contracts. 
Second, the optimal method obeys a simple, fundamental necessary condition: the 
interpretation of a term in a contingency is that which maximizes the expected payoff for  
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the subgroup of types who write the observed contract.  (For instance, the optimal 
interpretation of a general term calling for use of material A is determined by what 
material is best in the contingency for the conditional distribution of types who write the 
observed contract.)  In other words, to determine the optimal interpretation of a 
contractual term, the court behaves naively, as if its method of interpretation does not 
influence the set of contracts that are written (even though its method of interpretation 
generally does have this influence). 
Although a necessary condition for optimal interpretation is that interpretation is 
best for those who write the observed contract, this is not a sufficient condition for 
optimal interpretation.  For example, suppose that a gap might be filled in one of two 
ways: either as the majority wants or as the minority wants.  If the gap is filled as the 
minority wants and this induces the majority to write a term reflecting their wishes, then 
the gap is filled in the optimal way for those (the minority) who leave the gap, so the 
necessary condition is satisfied.  But this method of interpretation is not optimal, for it 
would be better to fill the gap as the majority wants, in order to reduce writing costs (then 
only the minority will bear the cost of writing a term reflecting their wishes).  And if the 
gap is filled as the majority wants and this leads the minority to write a term reflecting 
their wishes, then the gap is filled in the optimal way for those (now the majority) who 
leave the gap, so the necessary condition is also satisfied. 
Third, specific contractual terms are interpreted as they are written (so that if a 
term stipulates that material A should be used in a single, fully-described contingency,  
5 
this term will be respected by the courts).  In other words, it is not optimal for the courts 
to override specific terms.
4 
Fourth, it is sometimes desirable for the courts to override a general contractual 
term (such as a term requiring the use of material A in a broad set of circumstances).  The 
reason that overriding a general term might be desirable is, on one hand, that the parties 
may prefer that a different action from that provided in the term be taken when certain 
problematic contingencies arise (the parties might be made better off if material B is 
substituted for material A if the use of A becomes difficult).  On the other hand, the 
reason that the contracting parties might write the general term to begin with is, as 
indicated at the outset, that they find this economical in order to save writing costs.  Note 
too that bound up in the statement that the parties would often want to write a general 
term is that they are better off doing that than leaving gaps, for general terms frequently 
signal their desires.
5  
The point of the foregoing paragraph bears emphasis: contractual terms that give 
outwardly clear, unambiguous instructions for contingencies (such as use material A in a 
broad range of circumstances) may sometimes be best for the courts not to enforce, 
because the parties do not really want the terms enforced as written in the particular 
contingency that occurred.  Realistically, this point has substantial importance because of 
the omnipresence of general terms in contracts (on reflection, essentially any term is seen 
                                                 
4 However, this result relies on a simplifying assumption about the method of interpretation (that 
the interpretation of one term does not depend on other terms); see the discussion following Proposition 3. 
 
5 For instance, a person who is renovating his kitchen may specify that he wants an oak floor 
without qualification, even though he would not want oak  three percent of the time, when certain unusual 
contingencies arise, such as that a shortage in oak develops and delivery is delayed by six months.   In these 
contingencies, the person might want another hardwood (perhaps maple) substituted for oak, and the courts 
might well infer this preference for hardwood (rather than for tile or a composite material) from the fact 
that the term in question specifies oak.     
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to cover multiple contingencies
6).  Thus, latent in a court’s proper role in regard to 
virtually any contractual term is the possibility that the term should not be enforced as 
written. 
A fifth point follows from the fourth.  Although it may be desirable for the courts 
not to enforce a contractual term as written, but rather to interpret it, because many 
contracting parties wish for that in certain circumstances, some contracting parties may 
not want the term overridden (some parties may want material A to be used even if a 
problematic contingency occurs – they do not want B to be substituted for A).  This 
implies that it would be desirable for contracting parties to have a no-interpretation 
option (an “I really mean it” option) for each term.  If exercised, this option would imply 
that the courts would enforce the term exactly as written.  
In section 5, the model is extended to allow for the possibility of presentation to 
courts of evidence beyond the contract (for instance, the contractual negotiation history, 
the parties’ course of dealing, usual trade practice) at a cost.  It is assumed for simplicity 
that this extrinsic-to-the-contract evidence is perfect, allowing the courts to determine the 
ideal contractual term.  The effect of the ability to present such extrinsic evidence is 
determined, one of the main points being that specific terms are needed less often.  It is 
also observed that the decision about the use of evidence ought to be made by the parties, 
not the courts.  
In section 6, concluding comments are made about the generality of the 
conclusions, where it is explained that many (but not all) of the results hold regardless of 
                                                 
6 Even a highly detailed term (such as a term specifying that oak should be used for a kitchen floor 
unless there is a delay in supply of over six months or a price increase of over 100%) typically omits 
explicit mention of a multitude of potentially relevant contingencies (such as that oak becomes subject to 
an insect pest or that a new kind of wood is discovered that is more durable than oak, essentially the same 
in appearance, and cheaper).  
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assumptions made about the contractual environment, notably, concerning the 
contractibility of variables, renegotiation to avoid ex post inefficiency, and the 
information of the parties.  Comments are also made about actual legal practice in light of 
the analysis. 
Before proceeding, the relationship between this article and literature on contracts 
should be noted.  Articles of relevance include those concerning the costs of writing 
contracts; see Dye (1985) and, for example, Anderlini and Felli (1999), Battigalli and 
Maggi (2002), and Schwartz and Watson (2001).  In these articles, the question 
considered is how parties ought to simplify their contracts in order to save writing costs, 
but it is presumed that the contracts will be enforced as they are written.  Hence, the issue 
of the interpretation of contracts and its effects on the writing of contracts is not studied.  
More generally, the usual assumption in the incomplete contracting literature is that 
contracts are enforced as written, so that the interpretation of contracts is not examined.
7 
However, there are a number of articles (mostly in law reviews and law and 
economics journals) that do address, or touch upon, interpretation.  See Anderlini, Felli, 
and Postlewaite (2001), Ayres and Gertner (1989), Bebchuk and Shavell (1991), 
Bernstein (1996), Goetz and Scott (1985), Hadfield (1994), Posner (1998), and Schwartz 
(1992).  While suggestive, these articles do not state and develop the general view of 
interpretation set out here as a function that transforms the written contract into the 
interpreted one.
8   
                                                 
7 Some articles mention informally that courts engage in interpretation; see, for instance, the 
survey by Hart and Holmstrom (1987) at 148.  
  
8 Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2001) consider a model in which courts engage in a simple 
form of interpretation, voiding or not voiding a contract; the voiding of a contract can provide an implicit 
insurance benefit to the parties, who cannot contract in a set of indescribable contingencies.  Ayres and 
Gertner (1989) and Bebchuk and Shavell (1991) focus on the specific point that courts can fill gaps so as to  
8 
2. Assumptions  
  There is a population of risk-neutral contracting pairs.  The joint monetary payoffs 
to a contracting pair depend on the act and the contingency that occurs.  In particular, 
define 
               a = an act, where a , A, the universe of possible acts; 
              2i = a contingency, where 2i , S, the set of n possible contingencies; 
              pi = probability of 2i;            
     x(2i, a) = joint payoff to a pair of parties if the contingency is 2i and the act is a. 
An act may be interpreted as a vector with components corresponding to behaviors of 
both contracting parties.  The occurrence of contingencies and acts is assumed to be 
verifiable by the courts.  The joint payoff to the parties is the sum of the payoffs to each 
individually (for instance, the value of a good to the buyer minus the production costs 
incurred by the seller).  The act(s) that maximizes x(2i, a) for a given contingency 2i will 
be called the ideal act given 2i; this will be denoted a*(2i).
9   
A pair of contracting parties is identified by its type; let 
  t = type of pair of contracting parties, where t , T, the universe of possible types. 
The type t stands for the parties’ contractual situation and is a parameter of the payoff 
function, x, which will sometimes be written x(a, 2i, t); however, t will usually be 
                                                                                                                                                 
induce parties with private information to reveal it at the time of contracting.  Goetz and Scott (1985) 
emphasize difficulties courts face in interpreting non-standard express terms.  Hadfield (1994) examines a 
model of the interpretation of best effort clauses (she assumes that parties do not contract over effort levels 
but courts observe effort levels and penalize parties for inadequate effort).  Posner (1998) focuses on the 
issue of whether courts should restrict attention to the written contract or consider evidence extrinsic to it.  
Schwartz (1992) suggests that in practice courts often  interpret contracts in ways that are not consistent 
with parties’ wishes, and Bernstein (1996) argues that evidence from contract dispute resolution in trade 
associations indicates that commercial parties generally want to avoid interpretation.  Cohen (2000), 
Craswell (2000), and Katz (1998) survey contract interpretation from an economic viewpoint. 
 
9 For simplicity, I will usually discuss the ideal act as if it is unique. 
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suppressed in the notation.  Also, the ideal act will sometimes be written a*(2i, t), but t 
will usually be suppressed in the notation.  The courts cannot observe t but know its 
probability distribution; let 
  F(t) = probability distribution of types t. 
 A  contract K will be identified with a list of events and the act to be taken in each 
of the events. Let  
  K = {(E1, a1),..., (Em, am)}, 
where the Ej are mutually exclusive (but not necessarily exhaustive) events in S and aj is 
the act to be taken if Ej occurs.  An event and the associated act, that is, (Ej, aj), is called a 
term of the contract.  A contract will also have a contract price, but our focus will be on 
its terms (and for ease K will be called a contract even though K leaves out the price).  If 
the event Ej in a term is a single contingency 2i, the term is called a specific term; 
otherwise, the term is called a general term, as it names an act to be done for more than 
one contingency.  A contract is said to be explicitly complete if it has a specific term for 
each contingency.  If it is not explicitly complete, but does provide for all contingencies 
through its general terms, it is called implicitly complete; that is, an implicitly complete 
contract is such that the union of the events Ej in the contract is the universe S of all 
possible contingencies.  A contract is said to have gaps if it is not implicitly or explicitly 
complete, in other words, if the union of the Ej leaves out at least one contingency.
10 
                                                 
10 This terminology is different from that generally used in the contracting literature, for what I am 
calling an implicitly complete contract would often be described as an incomplete contract. 
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  Consider an example (which will be amplified below).  There are four alternative 
materials, A, B, C, and D that the seller can use in making something
11 and there are two 
possible contingencies, a normal contingency, 21, and an unusual, problematic 
contingency, 22.  A contract that says to use A in contingency 21 and to use D in 22 is 
explicitly complete; this contract has two terms, {(21, A), (22, D)}.  A contract that says 
to use C no matter what is implicitly complete; the contract has one term, {(21 or 22, C)}. 
This contract, note, is different from the explicitly complete contract that says to use C in 
21 and also to use C in 22; that contract has two terms, {(21, C), (22, C)}.
12  A contract 
that says only to use B in 21 has a gap because it does not provide for 22; the contract is 
{(21, B)}.   
  It is assumed that a contract involves a writing cost, which is a positive amount 
per term.
13  Let 
  "  = cost of writing a term; " > 0. 
Thus, in the example, the contract that says to use A in 21 and D in 22 costs 2" because it 
has two terms, whereas the contract that says to use C no matter what costs "  because it 
has one term.  Let  
  n(K) = number of terms in a contract K, 
                                                 
11 It is expositionally convenient to denote the acts in this example by A, B, C, and D rather than 
by a1, a2, a3, and a4 .  The example involves four acts because it turns out that this is the minimum 
necessary to illustrate the full range of possible outcomes that will be of interest. 
 
12 Admittedly, in this simple example, with only two contingencies, the difference between writing 
the general term “use C whether 21 or 22 occurs” and writing the pair of explicit terms “use C if 21 occurs” 
and “use C if 22 occurs” is not great.  However, in realistic situations, the event E in a general contractual 
term will cover a vast multitude of contingencies, so that writing “use C if E occurs” is much easier than 
naming all the 2 in E and writing a separate term for each saying that C should be used  
  
13 If the cost of making contracts depends in a more complicated way on the description of acts 
and events, it will be evident that the qualitative nature of the major conclusions would not be altered.  
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so that the cost of writing a contract is "n(K). 
   A contract K that the parties write is presumed to be treated by the courts 
according to a method of interpretation, denoted by M, which is known by contracting 
parties
14 and which the courts commit to employ.
15  This is a function whose argument is 
a contract K and whose value M(K) is a contract called the interpreted contract.  Let 
M(K) =  M({(E1, a1),..., (Em, am)}) = {(21 , a(21)),..., (2n , a(2n))}, 
where a(2i) is the act undertaken in 2i  and where the interpreted contract is assumed not 
to contain gaps.   It will be assumed that the method of interpretation is such that a(2i) is 
independent of contractual terms that do not cover 2i and that how a gap is filled is 
independent of contractual terms.
16  This independence assumption  is simplifying 
because it implicitly rules out inference in the interpretation of one term from the 
character of other terms; where it makes a difference to results will be indicated below.  
Note that M cannot be a function of the parties type t since this is not observed by the 
courts.
17 
To illustrate a method of interpretation, consider the example mentioned above 
and the following method: specific terms are interpreted as written; gaps are filled with 
                                                 
14 In reality, the interpretation of contracts is guided by various doctrines and principles, so that 
knowing M involves learning these doctrines and principles, which may not be as difficult as learning an 
arbitrary function M. 
  
15 The legal system is able to commit to employ rules by means of a variety of constraints on 
judges and juries, including the appeals process (meaning that decisions can be reversed if deviant) and 
rules of procedure and evidence.  
 
16 In other words, if 2i 0 Ej in a term (Ej, aj), then a(2i) does not depend on other terms; and if 
there is a gap at 2i, how the gap is filled does not depend on any terms. 
  
17 If the courts do observe information about parties’ type, then one can view F(t) as the 
distribution of t conditional on this information. 
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act A; general terms are interpreted as written, except that (21 or 22, C) is interpreted as 
{(21, C), (22, B)}, that is, the contract calling for C always is overridden in 22. 
  The (joint) expected value V of a contract K = {(E1, a1),..., (Em, am)} if it were 
enforced as it is written and has no gaps is 
              n 
(1)               V(K) =  3pix(2i, ai),   
                                  i 
 
where the (2i, ai) are as determined by the contract.
18, 19  However, because the contract 
that is actually enforced is the interpreted contract M(K), and because the contract 
involves a writing cost, the expected value (net of writing costs) of the contract K is given 
by 
(2)       V(M(K)) – "n(K).              
  To illustrate the calculation of the expected value of a contract, let us continue 
with the example. Suppose that the method of interpretation is the one discussed above 
and that the payoffs to the parties are given by the following table. 
 
        Payoffs as a function of contingencies and acts    
             A               B               C         D 
               21            15                9                18        22 
               22              6                4                12          8 
 
Assume as well that the probability of 21 is .8 and that of 22 is .2.  Also, assume that the 
writing cost "  per term is 2.  Then several calculations of the expected value of contracts 
                                                 
18 That is, for any 2i, find the event Ej containing2i  and define ai to be the act in the term (Ej, aj). 
 
19 Implicit in this expression is the assumption that the parties do not renegotiate their contract; for 
were they to do so, they would always obtain the ideal act a*(2i).  The assumption may be justified when 
there are costs of renegotiation (often problematic contingencies occur at unforeseen times and a decision 
must be quickly made by one party, making it difficult to bargain with the other contracting party).  
However, it will be evident from the concluding comments that many of the results reached would hold in a 
model with costless renegotiation and efficiency of actions ex post, where the purpose of contracts is to 
improve the efficiency of ex ante investments by combatting hold up problems.   
13 
are these:  If the contract is {(21, D)}, the interpreted contract, M({(21, D)}), is {(21, D), 
(22, A)} since the gap in 22 is filled with A; the number of terms in the written contract is 
one; hence its expected value is .8x22 + .2x6 – 2 = 16.8.  If the contract is {(21, C), (22, 
A)}, the interpreted contract is the same; the number of terms is two; and its expected 
value is .8x18 + .2x6 – 4 = 11.6.  And if the contract is {(21 or 22, C)}, the interpreted 
contract is {(21, C), (22, B)}; the number of terms is one; and its expected value is .8x18 
+ .2x4 – 2 = 13.2.     
3. Choice of the Written Contract Given the Method of Interpretation 
  It is assumed that parties write the contract with highest expected value, that is, 
the contract maximizes the expected value of the interpreted contract minus the writing 
costs.  (This assumption is consistent with the assumptions that parties are risk-neutral 
and that they each know the payoff function x(2i, a).)  Thus, the parties choose a contract 
K to maximize (2), which depends on the method of interpretation M.  Let K(M) be this 
contract (or, if the optimal contract is not unique, one of the optimal contracts).   
  Note that parties would choose the ideal explicitly complete contract, the contract 
with the ideal act a*(2i) for each contingency 2i, if contracts were enforced as written and 
there were no writing costs.  This ideal contract (the terms of which will sometimes be 
referred to as what the parties want or desire) is a natural benchmark for comparison with 
written contracts and interpreted contracts.   
  Let us first consider the contract that the parties in the example would choose.  It 
can be verified (by calculating the values of the possible contracts
20) that the parties’ best 
                                                 
20 There are twenty-nine possible contracts: sixteen explicitly complete contracts (such as {(21, A), 
(22, B)}), eight contracts with one gap (such as {(21, A)} or {(22, C)}), one contract with two gaps, and 
four contracts with general terms (such as{(21 or 22, A)}).   
14 
contract is {(21 or 22, D)}, a contract with a general term calling for use of D; since this 
contract is interpreted as written, its expected value is 17.2.  The optimality of this 
contract for the parties given the method of interpretation can be explained roughly as 
follows.  The ideal acts for the parties are D in 21 and C in 22.  Were the parties to write 
an explicitly complete contract with two terms (21, D) and (22, C), they would have to 
bear 4 in writing costs; their expected value would be 16.  They can do better by writing a 
less detailed contract with one term, namely, the contract specifying D all of the time.  It 
is true that under this contract, D rather than C is the act in 22, but this reduces the payoff 
by only 4, and thus by an expected amount of only .8, which is less than the writing cost 
of 2 of an extra term.  Among the contracts with one term, and thus involving the same 
writing cost, the parties could write a contract leaving a gap in 22, but a gap would be 
filled with A, which is inferior for the parties to D.      
  The preceding example illustrates how parties trade off specificity of terms for 
savings in writing costs, but no simple characterization of the optimal written contract 
given the method of interpretation is apparent.  However, it is worth noting general 
necessary conditions for a contract to be optimal.  There are three ways in which each 
contingency 2i can be treated in a contract: 2i can be provided for in a specific term; 2i 
can be included in the event Ej of some general term (Ej, aj); or 2i can be omitted, leaving 
a gap.  For a contract to be optimal, the choice among the three possibilities just 
mentioned must be made correctly for each 2i.
21 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
21 This necessary condition was in effect the basis of the explanation of the best contract to write 
in the example just considered.  For instance, that contingency 22  is part of a general term is due to the 
inferiority of 22 being provided for specifically (on account of the added writing cost) and to the inferiority 
of leaving a gap at 22  (on account of act A being worse than D).   
   
15 
Let us next comment on a number of paradigmatic relationships that may hold 
among the terms of written contracts, interpreted contracts, and the parties’ ideal 
contracts.    
(a) A specific term is interpreted as written and results in the ideal act for the 
parties:  This occurs when a specific term (2i, a) is interpreted as written and when the 
expected benefit of writing a specific term exceeds its writing cost ".  The expected 
benefit is determined by the probability of the contingency 2i and the benefit of the 
specific term, that is, the difference between the payoff under the ideal act a*(2i) and the 
payoff under the best alternative (either a gap or the best general term).
22  
(b) A general term is interpreted as written and always results in the ideal act for 
the parties:  This occurs when a general term (Ej, aj) is interpreted as written and aj is the 
ideal act for all contingencies in Ej.
23   
(c) A general term is interpreted as written but does not always result in the ideal 
act for the parties:  This occurs when a general term (Ej, aj) is interpreted as written, the 
parties do not want aj to be performed in at least some contingency 2i in Ej, but the 
expected gain from an alternative contract (writing an explicit term for 2i, including 2i in 
another general term, leaving a gap) is lower.
24   
                                                 
22 To illustrate in the example, if the writing cost " is .2 (rather than 2), the contract selected by the 
parties is the explicitly complete ideal contract, {(21, D), (22, C)}, for only by writing this contract will the 
ideal acts be taken, and the writing cost is low enough to justify that.  In particular, the expected value of 
{(21, D), (22, C)} is 19.6, whereas the expected value of {(21 or 22, D)} is 19; the latter contract is no 
longer superior because the writing cost is so low.  
 
23 Suppose that the payoffs in the table are modified: the payoff from D in 22  from 8 to 18, so that 
the ideal act is D in both 21 and 22.  Then the chosen contract is {(21 or 22, D)}, which is a general term 
that is interpreted as written, and which always results in the parties’ ideal act.  
 
24 This was already shown in the example, for the chosen contract was {(21 or 22, D)} but the 
parties want C rather than D in 22. 
  
16 
(d) A general term is overridden in a contingency and results in a superior act for 
the parties: This occurs when a general term (Ej, aj) is overridden in 2i and the act aj is 
replaced with a better act, such as a*(2i), saving the parties the cost of writing a separate 
term or of failing to obtain what they want in another general term or from a gap.
25   
(e) A general term is overridden in a contingency but the parties would be better 
off if the term were enforced as written: This occurs when a general term (Ej, aj) is 
overridden in 2i, aj is a better act in 2i, and the parties would be worse off with another 
term.
26    
(f) A gap is filled with the ideal act for the parties: This occurs when a gap for 2i 
is filled with a*(2i).  In this case, it is optimal for the parties to leave a gap, for they then 
obtain what they want without a writing cost.
27  
(g) A gap is filled with an act different from the ideal act for the parties: This 
occurs when a gap for 2i is filled with an act that the parties do not want but that is still 
superior to them to alternatives.
28   
                                                 
25 Suppose in the example that the payoff from B is 19 in 21 and 14 in 22 and the payoff from C is 
28 in 21.  Then the ideal acts are C in 21 and B in 22, the chosen contract is {(21 or 22, C)}, and this is 
interpreted as {(21, C), (22, B)}.   
  
26 Suppose in the example that the payoff from C in 21 is 28.  Then the ideal act is C in both 21 and 
22, the contract that would be written is {(21 or 22, C)}, which would be interpreted as {(21, C), (22, B)} 
even though the parties want C in 22.   Note here that the parties could obtain what they want with the 
explicitly complete contract{(21, C), (22, C)}but this would not be worth the added writing costs.  In 
particular, the expected value of {(21 or 22, C)} is 21.2 (because it is interpreted as {(21, C), (22, B)}) and 
the expected value of {(21, C), (22, C)} is only 20.8.   
 
27 Suppose in the example that the payoff from A in 22 is 14.  Then the ideal acts are D in 21 and A 
in 22, the contract that would be written is {(21, D)} and the gap in 22 would be filled with A. 
28 Suppose in the example that the payoff from B in 22  is 9 and from both C and D in 22 is 2.  
Then the ideal acts are D in 21 and B in 22, the contract that would be written is {(21, D)}, which would be 
filled with A in 22.  Note that in this case, {(21 or 22, D)} is not desired by the parties since act D in 22 is   
inferior to act A in 22, and that an explicitly complete ideal contract {(21, D), (22, B)} is not worth the 
writing costs. 
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4. The Optimal Method of Interpretation 
  Given a method of interpretation M, we can calculate the expected value of the 
contract chosen by contracting parties of any type t.  To be explicit, note that the value of 
any enforced contract, given by (1), depends on t because the x(2i, a) are in fact x(2i, a, 
t); hence (1) may written as V(K, t).  Also, the chosen contract K(M) described in the last 
section depends on t as well as on M, so we may write K(M, t) rather than K(M).  Hence, 
the  expected value W of the contract chosen by type t given M is 
(3)      W(M, t)  =  V(M(K(M, t)), t) – "n(K(M, t)).  
(The right side reflects the two effects of M: M influences the choice of the written 
contract, and M then determines how the written contract is interpreted.)  Hence, social 
welfare, that is, the expected value of contracts over the population of different types t is 
 
(4)     S =  IW(M, t)dF(t). 
                 T 
 
             Before continuing, an issue needs to be noted (even though it is somewhat 
distracting): for any method of interpretation, there is a family of equivalent methods of 
interpretation resulting in the same interpreted contracts, writing costs, and level of social 
welfare S.   In particular, let B denote a permutation of the set of acts A (that is, B is a 1:1 
mapping from A to A).  Given any method of interpretation M, define the B-permuted 
version MN of M as follows: (Ej, aj) is interpreted under MN in the way that (Ej, B(aj)) is 
interpreted under M, and gaps are interpreted identically under MN as under M.  For 
instance, if in our example, the permutation is B(A) = B, B(B) = C, B(C) = D, and B(D) = 
A, then under the B-permuted version of a method of interpretation, the specific term (21, 
A) would be interpreted as (21, B(A)) = (21, B) had been, the general term (21 or 22, D)  
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would be interpreted as (21 or 22, B(D)) = (21 or 22, A) had been, and so forth.  It is 
evident that the parties can obtain any interpreted contract under MN that they can obtain 
under M, and with the same number of terms -- if they write (Ej, aj) under M, let them 
write (Ej, B
-1(aj)) under MN.  (Thus, if they had written (21 or 22, A) under M, they would 
obtain the same outcome by writing (21 or 22, D) under MN.)  Conversely, they can obtain 
any interpreted contract under M as they can obtain under MN, and with the same number 
of terms -- if they write (Ej, aj) under MN, let them write (Ej, B(aj)) under M.  
Accordingly, for all parties, the menu of opportunities under MN and under M are 
identical, they will choose contracts resulting in the same interpreted contracts, and thus 
W(M, t) = W(MN, t).  In other words, we have   
REMARK 1.   Let MN be any permuted version of a method M of interpretation.  Then the 
interpreted contracts for parties of each type t will be identical under MN and M, and 
social welfare S will be the same under MN as under M.  
The optimal method of interpretation maximizes the expected value of contracts 
over the population of different types t; that is, the optimal method maximizes (4).
29  
                                                 
29 Note that types are presumed not to be able to send messages to the court declaring their type -- 
the method of interpretation is assumed to depend only on the contractual terms.  Were parties able to 
declare their type at no cost, then the ideal contract would be costlessly achieved trivially: let the 
mechanism be that if contracting parties declare they are of type t, the contract is always interpreted to be 
the ideal contract for type t.  Then parties would always announce their true type, not spend anything on 
contract terms, and obtain the ideal contract.  The justification for the assumption that parties cannot 
costlessly declare their type is that this is tantamount to declaring the entire function x(2i, a, t), which 
should be more costly than naming the ideal contract, but doing that has been assumed to be expensive.  In 
other words, the whole point of the present article is that it is expensive to convey information about 




Because of Remark 1, we know that the optimal method is not unique, but for ease, let us 
speak of “the” optimal method in any case.
30  
  Let us first show that some method of contract interpretation different from literal 
enforcement of contracts as written is optimal.  Under literal enforcement, whatever 
contract parties write is the interpreted contract and it is assumed that their contract 
leaves no gaps.  (As noted in the Introduction, literal enforcement is generally presumed 
in the literature on writing costs.)  We have   
PROPOSITION 1.  The optimal method of contract interpretation is strictly superior to literal 
enforcement of contracts as written. 
  Note.  The reason that this is true is that it is always possible to do better than 
literal enforcement by interpreting some gaps in ways that will allow at least some 
contracting parties to save writing costs.
31  (Of course, in general, the optimal method of 
interpretation involves more than the mere filling of gaps.)   
Proof.  Assume that contracts are literally enforced.  Consider any type t of  
contracting parties and any term (Ej, aj) in the contract they write.  Now consider a 
method of interpretation M in which all terms are interpreted as written and gaps for 2i in 
Ej are filled with act aj.  Under this method, the type t can be made better off by writing 
the same contract as before except leaving gaps for all 2i in Ej: under this contract, the 
parties of type t will obtain the same interpreted contract as before, but their writing cost 
                                                 
30 In particular, when under an optimal method a term is interpreted as written, we will focus on 
that method rather than a permuted version under which terms are not interpreted as written.  
 
31 The optimal method of interpretation is not necessarily superior to literal enforcement if, 
contrary to the assumption of this article, interpretation involves a cost.  Proposition 1 might thus be better 
expressed by the statement that the optimal method of interpretation has positive value.   
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will be reduced by ".  All other types will be at least as well off as before, as they can 
write the same contract they had before and be equally well off.//  
It is useful to illustrate the optimal method of interpretation with the often-
discussed case of filling a single gap where there are two possible ways to do so.   
Specifically, assume that there are two contingencies 21 and 22, that all parties want the 
same act C in 21, that a fraction q of parties want act A in 22 and would obtain a positive 
payoff r from A and 0 from the other act B, and that the remaining fraction 1 – q of 
parties wants act B in 22 and would obtain a positive payoff y from B and 0 from act A.  
In this case, the optimal method of interpretation is either to interpret a gap in 22 as A or 
as B.
32  If a gap is interpreted as A, then the A-types will leave a gap in 22 and the B-
types will leave a gap if p2y < " and otherwise will write a term, spending ", and obtain 
p2y - ".  Thus, the loss relative to the first-best will be p2y if this is less than the writing 
cost and otherwise the loss will be the writing cost, so the expected loss will be (1 - 
q)min(p2y, ").  Similarly, if a gap is filled with B, A-types will leave a gap if  p2r < ", and  
the expected loss will be qmin(p2r, ").  Thus, a gap should be filled with A if and only if   
(5)  qmin(p2r, ") > (1 - q)min(p2y, "). 
One case is where the writing cost is low enough that both groups would write their 
preferred term if the gap is not filled as they want.  In that case (5) reduces to q > (1 - q), 
so the gap is filled with the term preferred by the majority, in order to minimize writing 
costs.  Another case is where the writing cost is high enough that neither group would 
write its preferred term.  In that case, (5) reduces to qr > (1 - q)y, so that both the 
population proportion and the loss from the wrong term matter and the optimal decision 
                                                 
32 It is obviously best to interpret a gap in 21 as C since all parties want that.  
  
21 
is not necessarily to fill the gap with what the majority wants.  We may summarize as 
follows.
33  
REMARK 2.  In the simple situation where there are two ways to fill a gap, condition (5) 
determines how the gap is optimally filled.  Hence, the gap should be filled as the 
majority desires if the writing cost " is sufficiently low -- in which case each group 
would write its preferred term when the gap would not be filled as it wants; otherwise 
filling the gap as the majority desires might not be optimal.// 
  In the situation just examined, suppose that the writing cost " is sufficiently low 
that each group will write its preferred term if the gap in22 is not filled as it wants, and 
suppose that q > .5, so that A-types are in the majority and the gap should thus be filled 
with A.  Observe then that if the gap is filled with A, all parties who leave a gap will be 
A-types, so the interpretation of the gap will be optimal given the contracts that are 
written.  And observe too that if the gap is -- suboptimally -- filled with B, all parties who 
leave a gap will be B-types, so the interpretation of the gap will also be optimal given 
how contracts are written (now differently).  These observations show that interpreting a 
contractual term optimally given the way that contracts are written is not sufficient for 
interpretation to be optimal (as was noted in the Introduction).  The reason is that 
although the method of interpretation may be optimal given how contracts are written, the 
method also influences how contracts are written, and might not affect that in a desirable 
way.   
The observations also raise the question whether interpreting a term optimally, 
taking as given the way contracts are written, is a necessary condition for the method of 
                                                 
33 Ayres and Gertner (1989) state a similar conclusion at 114.   
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interpretation to be optimal.  The answer is yes.  As is now shown, a fundamental 
property of the optimal method of interpretation is that interpretation must be “naively” 
socially optimal – the interpretation of a term must be best for the types of parties who 
actually write the observed contract, which is to say, ignoring any effects of the method 
of interpretation on how contracts are written. 
PROPOSITION 2. (a)  The optimal method of interpretation must be optimal given the 
 
constraint that the contracts that are written by parties are fixed.  That is, if M* is the 
 
optimal method of interpretation (so that K(M*, t) is the contract written by parties of  
 
type t), then M* must maximize I[V(M(K(M*, t)), t) – "n(K(M*, t))]dF(t) over M.  
                                                             T 
(b) Hence, in any contingency 2i, the act called for under the optimal method of 
interpretation is the act that maximizes the expected payoff to contracting parties in 2i 
over the conditional distribution of types who write contracts with the observed term 
covering 2i.    
Notes.  The reasoning establishing part (a) is essentially as follows.  Suppose that, 
under the optimal method of interpretation M*, social welfare is not maximized given the 
contracts that parties write under M*.  Then there exists another method MN producing 
higher welfare given the contracts written under M*.  Now, in fact, the contracts written 
under MN will generally be different (since the contracts that are written depend on the 
method of interpretation), but this can only raise welfare.  Hence, M* could not have 
been optimal.   
Part (b), a corollary of part (a), is a substantial aid in determining the optimal 
method of interpretation because it means that attention can be restricted to a limited 
class of methods of interpretation.     
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Proof.  To prove part (a) we want to show that if M* is the optimal method of 
 
 interpretation, then M* maximizes I[V(M(K(M*, t)), t) – "n(K(M*, t))]dF(t) over M.  
                                                         T 
 Assume otherwise, that there exists an MN such that 
 
(6)    I[V(MN(K(M*, t)), t) – "n(K(M*, t))]dF(t) >  
         T 
I[V(M*(K(M*, t)), t) – "n(K(M*, t))]dF(t). 
                        T 
 
However, we know that 
 
(7)     I[V(MN(K(MN, t)), t) – "n(K(MN, t))]dF(t) $  
         T 
 
I[V(MN(K(M*, t)), t) – "n(K(M*, t))]dF(t), 
                        T 
 
since, for each t, V(MN(K(MN, t)), t) – "n(K(MN, t)) $ V(MN(K(M*, t)), t) – "n(K(M*, t)),  
 




(8)     I[V(MN(K(MN, t)), t) – "n(K(MN, t))]dF(t) > 
          T  
 
I[V(M*(K(M*, t)), t) – "n(K(M*, t))]dF(t), 
T 
 
which contradicts the supposed optimality of M*.   
 
  Part (b) follows from part (a).  In particular, since the contracts K(M*, t) are taken  
 
as given, for M to maximize I[V(M(K(M*, t)), t) – "n(K(M*, t))]dF(t), it must be that M  
                                              T 
maximizes IV(M(K(M*, t)), t)dF(t).  This implies that M maximizes the expected  
                  T 
payoff for each 2i.  Hence, it is evident that for any term (Ej, aj) and 2i in Ej, the  
 
interpreted act a maximizes Ix(2i, a, t)dF(t*T(Ej, aj)), where T(Ej, aj) = {t| K(M*, t)  
                                             T(Ej, aj) 
includes (Ej, aj)}. Likewise, if there is a gap at 2i, a must maximize 
                  
Ix(2i, a, t)dF(t*T(gap at 2i)), where T(gap at 2i) = {t| K(M*, t)} includes a gap at 2i.//   
T(gap at 2i)                        
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It may be noted that the proof of part (a) does not depend on the independence 
assumption.  If that assumption is relaxed, the conditional distribution in part (b) is of 
types who write the observed contract (rather than the generally wider class of types who 
write the observed term).  
  Let us next show another important property of the optimal method of 
interpretation. 
PROPOSITION 3.  Under the optimal method of interpretation, specific terms are 
interpreted as written.// 
  Note.  The explanation for the proposition is essentially that if the parties go to the 
expense of writing a term covering only a single contingency 2i, their welfare will be 
maximized if the act that results when 2i occurs is their ideal act a*(2i).  Hence, it is 
desirable for the method of interpretation to be such that their ideal act does in fact result 
when they write a specific term; and that will clearly be so if a specific term is interpreted 
as written, for then the parties will name their ideal act and obtain it if 2i occurs. 
Proof.  Let us show that any method of interpretation M in which specific terms 
are not interpreted as written is (weakly) dominated by another method MN defined to be 
the same as M, except that under MN specific terms are interpreted as written.  To 
demonstrate that M is dominated by MN, consider the contract K = K(M) that parties of 
some type t choose under M.  Either K does not contain specific provisions or it does.  If 
K does not contain specific provisions, then MN(K) = M(K) by definition of MN, so the 
parties are as well off choosing K under MN as under M.  And since the parties can choose 
K under MN and might choose a different contract, they must be at least as well off under 
MN as under M.  The other possibility is that K contains specific provisions.  In this case,  
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let the parties replace K with KN, which is the same as K except that in place of each 
specific provision (2i, a) in K is the specific provision (2i, a*(2i)).  The parties will be at 
least as well off under MN(KN) as under M(K): K and KN have the same number of terms 
and thus involve the same writing cost; any term that is not specific in K will also be a 
term in KN and will be interpreted in the same way under MN as under M;
34 and any term 
that is specific in K will be replaced with (2i, a*(2i)) and will result in the ideal act a*(2i) 
for 2i  rather than a(2i).  Since, then, for any type t, parties will be at least as well off 
under MN as under M, the expected value of MN is at least that of M.  Thus, we conclude 
that under an optimal method of interpretation, we may assume that any specific term 
will be interpreted as written.//    
As observed in a footnote, the proof of this proposition does depend on the independence 
assumption, raising the question whether the proposition holds otherwise.  In fact, it does 
not; an example is given in the appendix in which, under the optimal method of 
interpretation, a specific term is interpreted differently from how it is written.  The 
intuition underlying the example is that by writing an unusual specific term, different 
from the term the parties actually want, the parties can signal their type, and this 
information can be usefully employed in the interpretation of the entire contract;
35 the 
court can then interpret the unusual specific term in the way the parties really want, 
which is to say, not as written.
36 
                                                 
34 This step makes implicit use of the independence assumption about M, for the interpretation of a 
term that is not specific is assumed here not to depend on specific terms. 
  
35Note that such information cannot be used to interpret the rest of the contract if the independence 
assumption holds.    
 
36The example notwithstanding, my intuition is that the possibility that it would be optimal not to 
interpret a specific term as written is remote, perhaps a theoretical curiosity; for there should be a rich set of 
opportunities in the contract for parties to signal their type apart from the particular one just mentioned.    
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  The next proposition states that the paradigmatic types of outcomes discussed 
earlier in Section 3 can all occur under the optimal method of interpretation. 
PROPOSITION 4.  Under the optimal method of interpretation, when contracting parties 
write the contracts that are best for them, the following different types of outcome are 
possible for a pair of contracting parties:  
(a) a gap is filled in a way that is ideal for the parties; 
(b) a gap is filled in a way that is not ideal for the parties; 
(c) a general term is interpreted as written and this is ideal for the parties; 
(d) a general term is interpreted as written but this is not ideal for the parties; 
(e) a general term is overridden in a contingency and this is better for the parties; 
(f) a general term is overridden in a contingency but interpreting the term as written 
would be better for the parties.// 
This is shown in the appendix, which presents examples in which these outcomes occur 
under the optimal method of interpretation. 
  Now let us consider an opt-out rule, defined to be a rule under which contracting 
parties can specify, for any term, that the term will not be interpreted but rather enforced 
as written. 
PROPOSITION 5.  The opt-out rule, which allows contracting parties to specify that any 
term that they write not be interpreted by courts, is socially desirable.// 
Note.  The opt-out rule raises social welfare because it allows contracting parties 
to avoid outcome (f) of Proposition 4, that a general term would be overridden when that 
would lower the parties’ well-being.  (In the example given in the appendix, the CC type 
could guarantee that their contract {(21 or 22, C)} would not be overridden by opting out  
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of contract interpretation, whereas under the optimal method of interpretation, C would 
be overridden with E in 22.) 
Proof.  Let M be the optimal method of interpretation in the absence of the opt-
out possibility for contracting parties.  Any pair of contracting parties will be at least as 
well off if they have the opt-out provision under M than if not, and some parties may be 
better off, given possibility (f) of Proposition 4.  Hence, social welfare might be higher 
under M with the opt-out rule, and thus under whatever is the optimal method of 
interpretation under the opt-out rule.// 
5. Evidence Beyond the Contract 
  Let us now consider briefly the possibility that the court considers not only the 
contract but also evidence going beyond the contract.  In fact, the courts often do 
consider such evidence, including the parties’ contract negotiating history, their business 
dealings with each other during the life of the contract, other contracts they have made, 
and customs and norms in their industry.  Let 
  $ = cost of presenting evidence, 
where the cost is borne by the parties.  If evidence is presented, assume for simplicity that 
it is perfect, allowing the court to determine the parties’ ideal act a*(2i, t) in the 
contingency 2i.  Assume also that the cost of presenting evidence exceeds the cost of 
writing a specific term, 
(9)  $ > ", 
the motivation being that at least as much information usually has to be presented to 
convince a court that some action a is optimal as merely to name that action in a contract, 
and further that parties are likely to be contesting each other’s evidence in court.  Assume  
28 
also that the parties can costlessly specify in their contract the set of contingencies for 
which evidence will be presented.
37  Let 
  R = set of contingencies in which evidence will be presented. 
Assume then that if 2i , R, evidence will be presented and the act that will be enforced is 
a*(2i, t) for the parties of type t.  Finally, assume for ease that the method of 
interpretation M does not depend on R. 
  Let us examine how parties will write contracts, assuming that specific terms are 
interpreted as written.
38  We have  
PROPOSITION 6.  Suppose that contracting parties stipulate in their contract in what 
contingencies they will present evidence to the court.  Then  
(a) a specific term will not be written for any contingency with a probability less than or 
equal to the threshold p* =  "/$;  
(b) evidence will not be presented for any contingency with a probability exceeding p* 
(that is, R does not contain any 2i for which pi >  p*); and  
(c) evidence will be presented if and only if the cost is less than the joint loss from not 
doing so, namely, 
(10)     $ < x(a*(2i, t), 2i, t) - x(a(2i), 2i, t). 
(That is, given the terms of the contract, (10) determines R.)// 
  Note.   Because it is more expensive to present evidence to determine the ideal act 
a*(2i, t) than to provide for it explicitly in the contract, it makes sense that parties will 
                                                 
37 This assumption of costlessness is motivated by the fact that the parties do not specify an action 
for any contingency in R, but it is an inessential assumption.   If it were supposed that there is a cost r per 
contingency that is included in R, then in Proposition 6, p* would be (" ! r)/ $ and (10) would be replaced 
by $ < x(a*(2i, t), 2i, t) ! x(a(2i), 2i, t) ! r/ pi.  
 
38 This is a feature of the optimal method of interpretation; essentially the same proof as that of 
Proposition 3 applies.  
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provide explicitly for it rather than present evidence if the likelihood of the contingency 
is sufficiently high; but if the likelihood is low, they save by avoiding the ex ante cost of 
specific provision.  This explains parts (a) and (b).  Part (c) is clear; if the loss from a 
less-than-ideal act in 2i under a general contractual term would exceed the cost $ of 
presenting evidence, then the parties will arrange to present evidence in order to eliminate 
the loss.  
Proof.  Writing a specific term for a contingency 2i and stipulating that if 2i 
occurs evidence be presented are substitutes, in that each results in the ideal act a*(2i, t) 
if 2i occurs.  The cost of a specific term (rather than a gap or including 2i in a general 
term) is ", and the expected cost of having evidence presented if 2i occurs (by including 
2i in R) is pi$.  Accordingly, if pi < p*, then pi$ < "; it is cheaper to have the court 
consider evidence ex post than to bear the certain cost " of a specific term, demonstrating 
(a) (if pi = p*, the parties are indifferent, and we assume for convenience that they would 
not write a specific term).  Conversely, if  pi > p*, then pi$ > "; it is more expensive to 
have the court consider evidence ex post than to bear the certain cost " of a specific term, 
demonstrating (b).  Part (c) is self-explanatory.// 
Parts (a) and (b) do not hold if the assumption of independence about M is relaxed, for 
then writing a specific term generally affects the interpretation of all other terms, not just 
the outcome in 2i.   
  Two observations may be added.  First, the parties’ choice of the set R in which to 
present evidence depends on their type t – notably, to know what their loss would be if 
they did not present evidence and relied on the court’s interpretation depends on their 
type (see (10)).   Hence, the court is not itself able to determine when it would be best for  
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evidence to be presented; if the court decides when evidence is presented, social welfare 
will fall.  Second, as a general matter, the optimal method of interpretation will change 
from what it is in the absence of the possibility of presentation of evidence, for, among 
other factors, the danger of large losses from errors in interpretation is bounded by the 
cost $ of presentation of evidence. 
6. Concluding Comments 
Generality of the analysis. The basic structure of the model of optimal 
interpretation considered here applies independently of the assumptions made about the 
contractual environment, in particular, relating to the contractibility of variables, 
renegotiation, and the information of the parties.  That is, in any contractual environment, 
one can consider a method of interpretation M to be a function that transforms a written 
contract K into the interpreted contract K(M); contracting parties of type t will, given M 
and the assumed bargaining process, select a contract K(M, t) and the actual contract that 
is employed will thus be M(K(M, t)); and the problem of the court, supposing that it does 
not observe t, will be to choose M to maximize IW(M, t)dF(t), where W(M, t) is the  
                                                                            T 
addition to social welfare when parties of type t choose K(M, t) and the contract that  
 
governs is M(K(M, t)).    
 
Moreover, many of the conclusions reached about optimal interpretation hold in 
fairly broad circumstances, because the arguments for the conclusions often did not 
depend on the particulars of the model studied here.  Proposition 1, that some method of 
interpretation is desirable, is true whenever contracting parties can save writing costs or 
contracting effort by leaving a gap.
39  Proposition 2(a), that the optimal method M* is 
                                                 
39 Recall that the essence of the argument for the proposition was that if contracts are enforced as 
written (there is no interpretation), one can select any term in the contract written by any type t and employ  
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naively optimal -- is best for the conditional distribution of types t who write the 
observed contract – is valid as long as contracting parties maximize their joint welfare 
W(M, t) given M.
40  Likewise, Proposition 3, that specific terms are enforced as written 
when the method of interpretation is assumed to display independence holds.
41   The 
various types of outcome described in Proposition 4, including the overriding of general 
terms, it is evident will be possibilities under the optimal method of intepretation. 
Let me now comment on several factors that were not taken into account in the 
analysis and how doing so would affect the conclusions. 
                                                                                                                                                 
the method of interpretation M under which gaps are filled with the act aj that had been specified in this 
term.  M will then allow the type t to leave a gap in the term and obtain the same contract as before, and 
other types can always write the contracts that they had before.  This argument that M will lead to an 
increase in social welfare applies whatever the nature of contractual terms (for instance, if a term names 
damages for breach), as long as contracting parties save writing cost or contracting effort by leaving a gap.  
 
40 The proof is essentially that given above.  In particular, we want to show that M* maximizes 
I[V(M(K(M*, t)), t) – "(K(M*, t))]dF(t) over M, where "(K) is some writing or effort cost associated with 
T 
a contract K (not necessarily the simple one assumed in the analysis).  Then if the claim is not true, there 
exists an MN such that 
(6N)    I[V(MN(K(M*, t)), t) – "(K(M*, t))]dF(t) >  
         T 
I[V(M*(K(M*, t)), t) – "(K(M*, t))]dF(t). 
                            T 
However, we know that 
(7N)     I[V(MN(K(MN, t)), t) – "(K(MN, t))]dF(t) $  
           T 
I[V(MN(K(M*, t)), t) – "(K(M*, t))]dF(t), 
                             T 
since, for each t, V(MN(K(MN, t)), t) – "(K(MN, t)) $ V(MN(K(M*, t)), t) – "(K(M*, t)), because of the 
assumption that the parties choose K to maximize their joint welfare W(MN, t) = V(MN(K), t) – "(K) given 
MN.  Combining (6N) and (7N), we obtain 
(8N)     I[V(MN(K(MN, t)), t) – "(K(MN, t))]dF(t) > 
          T  
I[V(M*(K(M*, t)), t) – "(K(M*, t))]dF(t), 
T 
which contradicts the supposed optimality of M*.   
  
41  It is clear that the argument that any method of interpretation M in which specific terms are not 
interpreted as written is (weakly) dominated by another method MN defined to be the same as M, except 
that under MN specific terms are interpreted as written, holds generally, given the assumption that methods 
of interpretation display independence.   
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One factor that was not considered in the model is renegotiation, since in the 
model it was assumed that contractual terms directly determine outcomes, even though 
they might be inefficient.  Suppose instead that one makes assumptions as in much of the 
literature on contracting: renegotiation always leads to efficient outcomes ex post, and the 
purpose of contracts is to improve the choice of ex ante investment, notably by implicitly 
combatting the problem of hold-up.
42  In this type of model, although the value of 
interpreted contracts would be determined by how well the contracts improve investment 
decisions, the main qualitative conclusions about optimal interpretation would hold, as 
indicated two paragraphs above.  However, Proposition 2(a), that M* is naively optimal, 
must be carefully construed.  It does not imply that the court interprets a term in the way 
that is ex post efficient for those who write the observed contract, but rather that the court 
interprets the term so as to foster investment incentives for those who write the observed 
contract.  Suppose, for instance, that a contract specifies specific performance, and it is 
obvious to the court that performance is inefficient because the cost of performance far 
exceeds the value to the buyer.  This does not imply that the court should interpret the 
contract as excusing performance.  Since the parties may well have chosen specific 
performance to enhance the buyer’s incentives to invest,
43 the best thing for the court to 
do may well be to enforce specific performance (that is, the court may know that the 
purpose of specific performance is to improve investment incentives and that ex post 
efficiency, here nonperformance, will come about through renegotiation).  
                                                 
42 See, for example, Hart and Holmström (1987) and Tirole (1999).   
 
43 For example, in Rogerson (1984), an early model of breach remedies with renegotiation, 
specific performance leads to superior buyer investment decisions than does the expectation measure or the 
reliance measure of damages for breach.  
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Another factor of interest is asymmetry of information between the contracting 
parties.  In the model, the parties were assumed to have symmetric information.  If they 
do not, then two of the conclusions reached do not hold.  First, the conclusion that the 
optimal method of interpretation M* is naively optimal is not true.  A prototypical 
example is where a contracting party chooses an inefficient term in order to masquerade 
as another kind of party and thereby to gain a price advantage.
44  The optimal 
interpretation of the term might be to override it to obtain the efficient action, even 
though that interpretation is not best on average for the set of individuals who write the 
observed contract, thus contradicting Proposition 2(a).
45  The second major difference in 
conclusions when information is asymmetric is that the optimality of allowing parties to 
opt out of interpretation might not hold.  For instance, some individuals who sign 
installment payment agreements for consumer goods that allow the seller to repossess if 
they are even a day late in making payments might overestimate the likelihood that they 
will make all payments on time.  By signing an opt out clause, they guarantee the 
repossession feature of the contract even though it may be against their interests; 
disallowing opt out might therefore be socially beneficial. 
Another factor not considered is the indescribability of events.  In particular, a 
reason that parties do not write very detailed contracts is that some events may not be 
readily describable (perhaps because these events do not happen to be in the conscious 
minds of the parties at the time of contracting).  If so, the events named in contractual 
                                                 
44 See Spier (1992) on this and related issues. 
  
45 Also, it is evident why the proof of Proposition 2(a) does not hold when parties have 
asymmetric information.  Inequality (7N) in note 40 does not necessarily apply, for the contract that is 
chosen does not necessarily maximize the contracting parties’ joint welfare V(MN(K), t) – "(K) given MN.  
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terms would be restricted to the set of describable events.  This restriction, however, 
would not alter the main conclusions about the optimal method of interpretation,
46 and it 
would seem to make interpretation more valuable because indescribability would increase 
the need to modify terms in the light of the realization of outcomes. 
Legal practice.  Several points about the interpretation of contracts in practice 
seem worth making in the light of the foregoing analysis.  First, as stated at the outset, 
contractual interpretation is an important function of the courts (one commentator cites 
25% as the fraction of contract cases concerned with interpretation
47), and interpretation 
is much more often concerned with the overriding of terms and related matters than with 
the filling of gaps in the sense of unprovided for contingencies.
48  
Second, the ability of parties to control interpretation by explicitly opting out of 
interpretation of a term is circumscribed,
49 even though a legal policy of allowing such 
opting out often is socially desirable (Proposition 6).  (Still, the reluctance of courts to 
allow opting out could be justified by a concern that a party to the contract is opting out 
of interpretation because, as just noted above, and unlike in the model, he has less 
information than the other party and fails to understand that opting out disadvantages him 
or because of ambiguity in the meaning of words.) 
                                                 
46 If the only change in the assumptions of the analysis is that the events Ej be in the set of 
describable events, then it is readily verified that the proofs of Propositions 1-3 are unchanged.  Proposition 
3 applies only in respect to contingencies that are describable.  Proposition 4 could be shown using an 
example constructed along the lines of that in the appendix.  Proposition 5 is a corollary of Proposition 4.   
 
47 See Farnsworth (1999) at 426.  
 
48 Perusal of chapter 7 of Farnsworth (1999), or discussion with practicing lawyers, will reveal that 
interpretation usually involves overriding terms, resolving ambiguities of language, or settling internal 
contradictions in terms, and only unusually involves outright failure to provide instructions for a 
contingency.  (Nevertheless, commentators often describe interpretation as the filling of gaps.)  
 
49 Chapter 7 of Farnsworth (1999); personal communications with teachers of contracts courses.  
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Third, the issue of the use of evidence extrinsic to contracts in their interpretation 
is of significance in actual practice and is also much debated.  Whereas it was assumed in 
Section 5 that extrinsic evidence was perfect, this evidence is highly imperfect in reality 
and is very costly to consider (especially because of the tendency of parties to contest 
negotiating history, oral statements, course of dealing).  Thus, the question whether the 
value of extrinsic evidence in contractual interpretation exceeds its cost to the parties is a 
real one.  Accordingly, the ability of the parties to control whether the courts will 
examine extrinsic evidence would seem to be of subsantial importance to them.  
However, their power to limit interpretation to the written contract is restricted
50 (which 
is of a piece with their difficulty in opting out of interpretation altogether).  Possibly this 
is due to the courts’ belief that the parties’ true desires should be discovered at trial, 
without due regard to the cost to the parties of the necessary inquiry. 
                                                 
50 Notably, the parol evidence rule, requiring a court to focus on the written contract and to bar 
extrinsic evidence if the contract was intended to be an “integrated” expression of the parties’ desires, is 
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Example in which a specific term is not enforced as written under the optimal 
method of interpretation.  As stated in the text after Proposition 3, if the assumption that 
the method of interpretation obeys independence is relaxed, then it is possible that a 
specific term is not enforced as written under the optimal method of interpretation.  The 
following example demonstrates this possibility.   
There are two contingencies 21 and 22, each occurring with probability .5; five 
acts, A, B, C, D, E; and a writing cost " of 1.  A contractual type will obtain a positive 
payoff of 4 under one preferred act in each contingency and 0 otherwise.  For instance,  
the type AB obtains a payoff of 4 if A is the act in 21 but obtains 0 otherwise in that 
contingency, and the type obtains a payoff of 4 if B is the act in 22 but obtains 0 
otherwise in that contingency.   The types in the population are these: AA, CB, CC, DD, 
EE, AB, AE, CD, DE, EA, DA, EB, AC, DB, CE, and AD, and the fraction of each type 
is .01, except that the fraction of type AD is .85.  Now consider a method M of 












Type  Written Contract   Interpreted Contract 
AA  {(21 or 22, A)}  {(21, A), (22, A)} 
CB  {(21 or 22, B)}  {(21, C), (22, B)} 
CC  {(21 or 22, C)}  {(21, C), (22, C)} 
DD  {(21 or 22, D)}  {(21, D), (22, D)} 
EE  {(21 or 22, E)}  {(21, E), (22, E)} 
AB  {(21, A)}  {(21, A), (22, B)} 
AE  {(21, B)}  {(21, A), (22, E)} 
CD  {(21, C)}  {(21, C), (22, D)} 
DE  {(21, D)}  {(21, D), (22, E)} 
EA  {(21, E)}  {(21, E), (22, A)} 
DA  {(22, A)}  {(21, D), (22, A)} 
EB  {(22, B)}  {(21, E), (22, B)} 
AC  {(22, C)}  {(21, A), (22, C)} 
DB  {(22, D)}  {(21, D), (22, B)} 
CE  {(22, E)}  {(21, C), (22, E)} 
AD  {A}*  {(21, A), (22, D)} 
*The contract has no terms – gaps for 21 and 22 
 
Note that the method M is described for all contracts with one term and for the double 
gap, but not for explicitly complete two-term contracts. (However, it will not matter how 
M is defined for such contracts.)  Note as well that M does not obey independence, for 
the interpretation of gaps depends on the accompanying specific term. 
It is evident why each type chooses the contract shown in the table.  It is obvious 
that type AD will chooses the double gap, as that is costless.  Each other type obtains its 
ideal contract at a cost of 1 by writing the indicated one term contract, whereas if it 
spends nothing and leaves a double gap, its expected payoff would fall by at least 2.   
  That M is optimal follows from two observations.  All types obtain their ideal 
contracts with contracts with one term or the double gap contract.  The type that writes 
the double gap contract is AD, the most numerous (.85 vs. .01).  
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  Observe that type AE writes the specific term (21, B) yet B is interpreted as A, so 
the specific term is not interpreted as written, which is what we claimed.  (One can view 
the explanation as follows.  Type AB implicitly signals its type by writing B as the act in 
the specific term for 21, but having done that, it is best for A to be the actual interpreted 
act in 21.) 
  Moreover, although there are other optimal methods, under any optimal method 
the contract {(21, B)} will be interpreted differently from B.  In particular, observe that 
any permutation of the first 15 rows of the interpreted contract column will also be 
optimal: for any permutation is just another way of allowing each of the 15 types with 
fraction .01 to obtain their ideal contracts with a one term contract; the double gap 
contract must be for the AD types due to their high fraction.  But there is no type for 
whom B is the ideal act in 21.  Thus, since the interpreted contract must be the ideal 
contract for some type, it cannot be interpreted as B. 
 
  Proof of Proposition 4.  We want to demonstrate that the outcomes listed in 
Proposition 4 are possible under an optimal method of interpretation, where M is 
assumed to display independence.  Consider a variation of the example just discussed 
above with two equally likely contingencies, acts A, B, C, D, E and payoff functions as 
were described.  The types in the population are these: CD, DE, CE, DD, EE, BB, CB, 
DB, EB, AA, AC, AD, AE, and AB, and the fraction of each type is .01, except that the 
fraction of type AB is .85.  Now consider a method M of interpretation and the contracts 




Type  Written Contract   Interpreted Contract 
CD  {(21 or 22, A)}  {(21, C), (22, D)} 
DE  {(21 or 22, B)}  {(21, D), (22, E)} 
CE  {(21 or 22, C)}  {(21, C), (22, E)} 
DD  {(21 or 22, D)}  {(21, D), (22, D)} 
EE  {(21 or 22, E)}  {(21, E), (22, E)} 
-  {(21, A)}  {(21, A), (22, B)} 
BB  {(21, B)}  {(21, B), (22, B)} 
CB  {(21, C)}  {(21, C), (22, B)} 
DB  {(21, D)}  {(21, D), (22, B)} 
EB  {(21, E)}  {(21, E), (22, B)} 
AA  {(22, A)}  {(21, A), (22, A)} 
-  {(22, B)}  {(21, A), (22, B)} 
AC  {(22, C)}  {(21, A), (22, C)} 
AD  {(22, D)}  {(21, A), (22, D)} 
AE  {(22, E)}  {(21, A), (22, E)} 
AB  {A}*  {(21, A), (22, B)} 
*The contract has no terms – gaps for 21 and 22 
 
Note that M displays independence, for the interpretation of a gap in 21 is A regardless of 
the term for 22 and the intepretation of a gap in 22 is B regardless of the term for 21.  
Note also that specific terms are interpreted as written (which we can assume is true of an 
optimal method, by Proposition 3).  
It is evident why each type chooses the contract shown in the table.  It is obvious 
that type AB will chooses the double gap, as that is costless.  Each other type obtains its 
ideal contract at a cost of 1 by writing the indicated one term contract, whereas if it 
spends nothing and leaves a double gap, its expected payoff would fall by at least 2.   
  That M is optimal follows from two observations.  All types obtain their ideal 
contracts with contracts with one term or the double gap contract.  The type that writes 
the double gap contract is AB, the most numerous (.85 vs. .01).   
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  Observe that there is a general term that is interpreted as written, which is ideal 
for the parties, for instance {(21 or 22, D)}.  There is also a general term that is not 
interpreted as written, which is ideal for the parties, for instance {(21 or 22, C)} (here the 
parties obtain E in 22, which is desirable for them.  There is also a gap that is interpreted 
in a way that is good for parties, for instance{(21, B)}. 
  The example can be slightly modified to illustrate the other possibilities.  Suppose 
that there is a group CC, for whom there is not only a payoff of 4 if C is the act in either 
contingency, but also a payoff of 3 if A is the act in21.  Assume also that the fraction of 
this group is very small (and that of the other groups are reduced proportionally), so that 
the optimal M does not change.  Then the CC type will choose {(22, C)}, for this way 
they obtain A in 21, whereas the only way they can obtain their ideal contract is by 
writing {(21, C), (22, C)}, which would cost them 1 but increase their expected return by 
only .5 (that is, their expected return would fall from from 3.5 – 1 = 2.5 to 4 – 2 = 2).  
Hence, the CCs would choose a contract with a gap that would not be filled as they want. 
  To show that a general term may not be interpreted as written and that it would be 
better for parties that it is interpreted as written, consider another modification.  Let there 
be a group of CC, for whom there is not only a payoff of 4 if C is the act in either 
contingency, but also a payoff of 3 if E is the act in 22.  As in the previous paragraph, 
assume that this group is small enough that the optimal M does not change.  The CC type 
will choose {(21 or 22, C)}, which will be interpreted as E in 22 even though the CC type 
would prefer that this general term be interpreted as written. 
  Finally, to show that a general term may be interpreted as written and that it 
would be better for parties that it be interpreted otherwise, consider the following  
43 
modification of the example.  Let there be a group of DA, for whom there is not only a 
payoff of 4 if D is the act in 21 and if A is the act in 22, but also a payoff of 3 if D is the 
act in 22.  Again, assume that this group is small enough that the optimal M does not 
change.  The DA type will choose {(21 or 22, D)}, which will be interpreted as written 
but they would prefer that A be the act in 22. 
 
  For completeness, let us also demonstrate that Proposition 4 holds if M is not 
assumed to display independence.  To do this, we will use the initial example in the 
appendix and variations of it.  The initial example involves a general term that is 
interpreted as written, where this is ideal for the parties, for instance {(21 or 22, A)}; it 
also has a general term that is not interpreted as written, where this is ideal for the parties, 
for instance {(21 or 22, B)}; it involves as well a contract with a gap that is filled in an 
ideal way, for instance {(22, E)}.   
To show that a gap may be filled in a way that is not ideal for the parties, let there 
be a group of BB, for whom there is not only a payoff of 4 if B is the act in either 
contingency, but also a payoff of 3 if E is the act in 21.  Assume that this group is small 
enough that the optimal M does not change.  The BB type will choose {(22, B)}, so the 
gap will be interpreted as E but they they would prefer that B be the act in 21. 
To show that a general term may be interpreted as written but this is not what is 
desired by parties, let there be a group of CA, for whom there is not only a payoff of 4 if 
C is the act in 21 and if A is the act in 22, but also a payoff of 3 if A is the act in 21.  
Assume that this group is small enough that the optimal M does not change.  The CA  
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type will choose {(21 or 22, A)}, which will be interpreted as written, but they would that 
C be the act in 21. 
Last, to show that a general term may not be interpreted as written but the parties 
would prefer that it be interpreted as written, let there be a group of BB, for whom there 
is not only a payoff of 4 if B is the act in either contingency, but also a payoff of 3 if C is 
the act in 21.  Assume that this group is small enough that the optimal M does not change.  
The BB type will choose {(21 or 22, B)}, which will be interpreted as C in 21, but they 
would that B be the act in 21. 
 
 
 
 
  